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# BotWatcher

## Transparent and Generic Botnet Tracking


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RAID 2015, Kyoto, Japan



Cyber Analysis & Defense (CA&D)

# Botnets



source: <http://core0.staticworld.net/images/article/2013/04/botnet-100034898-orig.jpg>

# Motivation

- Complexity of botnets is increasing
  - Comprises several MW stages/MW families/malicious actions
- Understanding the botnet *life-cycle* is important for further investigations and countermeasures

# Related Work

## ■ Botnet Tracking

- [Caballero2011], [Rossow2011], [Rossow2012], [Rossow2013]

## ■ Botnet Infiltration and Takeover

- [Kanich2008], [Stone-Gross2009], [Rossow2013]

## ■ Sandboxes

- Time-based evasion

However, current solutions do not support life-cycle investigations

- Lack of **Genericity** (no assumptions about malware)
  - Lack of **Transparency** (hard to detect analysis environment)
-




# Contributions

1. Transparent and generic botnet tracking
2. Inference Rules for reconstructing malicious behavior
3. Evaluation of prototype on Windows and OS X


# BOTWATCHER

# General Overview




# Phase I: Execution Feature Extraction

- Extraction of system state  $S$  from outside
- $S(t)$  is described by a set of execution features present at  $t$
- Host-based (memory)
  - Program execution and interaction with OS result in a lot of changes in memory
  - Monitoring allows reconstruction of series of actions that caused changes
- Network-based



# Phase II: Execution Event Generation

- Comparison of  $S(t-1)$  and  $S(t)$  for detecting state transitions, i.e. determination of execution events




# Phase III: Event Correlation

- Inferring high-level (malicious) behavior from low-level execution events

- Inference rules

$$\frac{P_1 \quad P_2 \quad \dots \quad P_n}{C}$$



## Phase III: Event Correlation

$$\frac{\text{DOWNLOAD}[pp_{id}, ts_1] \quad \mathcal{P}[p_{id}, pp_{id}, \tau_{\text{create}}, ts_2] \quad ts_2 \geq ts_1}{\text{MALWAREDOWNLOAD}[p_{id}, ts_2]}$$



$$\frac{\mathcal{N}[s, p_{id}, \tau_{\text{start}}, -, ts_1] \quad [s, p_{id}, \tau_{\text{stop}}, -, ts_2] \quad ts_2 \geq ts_1}{\text{DOWNLOAD}[p_{id}, ts_2]}$$

# EVALUATION



# Case Studies

## ■ Prototype

- VirtualBox, Volatility and Bro

## ■ Microsoft Windows XP and 8 32 bits



- **Upatre, Emotet**, Gamarue, Necurs

## ■ Mac OS X Mavericks 64 bits




- VidInstaller

## ■ Duration up to one week


# Case Study Upatre: Introduction

- Very small dropper
  - Entrypoint to complexer botnet infrastructures
  - In this case: Kegotip, Pushdo and Dyre
- Tracking period: 2015-01-15 – 2015-01-22


# Case Study Upatre: Results




# Case Study Upatre: Results




# Case Study Upatre: Results



# Case Study Upatre: Results



# Case Study Upatre: Results (Kegotip Download)



# Case Study Emotet: Introduction

- Modular botnet

- Feodo, Geodo, Cridex, Dridex, ...


- Several modules

- Dropper, spammer, grabber, ...


- Tracking period: 2015-05-19 – 2015-05-22




# Case Study Emotet: Results



# Case Study Emotet: Results



# Case Study Emotet: Results



# Discussion of Evaluation

- Threw light on several botnets
  - Detected several malicious actions
  - Intercepted MW updates and new MW downloads
  - Witnesses phases of botnet activity
- Gives malware analyst further pointers
- Circumvented time-based evasion techniques
  - Client-side and server-side

# Limitations

- Memory dump frequency
  - Evaluate thoroughly intervals between two dumps
- Analysis environment detection
  - Possible solution: make it run on bare-metal

# CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

# Conclusion & Future Work

## ■ Transparent and generic botnet tracking

- Outside view of analysis system
- Inference rules reconstructing malicious behavior
- Platform-independent

## ■ Future work

- Perform long-term analysis
- Extend inference rule set
- Improve behavior attribution for multiple malwares on the machine



# JAPAN IN BONN/GERMANY ...



source: <https://drscdn.500px.org/photo/66124681/m%3D2048/56532151378f51a812301477e2c86a0b>